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A WALL OF LEGISLATIVE OBSTACLES IN 
THE PATH OF A WOMAN EXERCISING HER 
RIGHT TO AN ABORTION: PLANNED 
PARENTHOOD ARIZONA INC. V. BETLACH 
BY ANGELA BRESLIN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
(The Constitution) is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and 
familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our 
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict 
with the Constitution of the United States.1 
Abortion rights are controversial; on this we can all agree.  
Emotions and opinions aside, constitutionally protected rights must be 
enforced by courts through invalidating legislative actions that infringe 
on those rights.  A woman has a constitutional right to an abortion.2  In 
2012, the Arizona legislature attempted to limit that right.  The 
legislature enacted a statute that would have deprived any physician who 
performs elective abortions, or any facility where elective abortions are 
performed, from receiving Medicaid funding for any of their services, 
including family planning and preventive care.3  In Planned Parenthood 
Arizona Inc. v. Betlach (“Betlach”), a physician, three individuals, and 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2015, Golden Gate University School of Law. I would like to extend my 
gratitude to Kassie Cardullo, Professor Helen Chang and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their 
invaluable guidance throughout the writing and editorial process. 
 1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (quoting Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)).  
 2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 3 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.05(B) (Westlaw 2014). 
1
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Planned Parenthood sued to have the statute declared invalid as a 
violation of federal law.  The district court granted summary judgment to 
the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined the State from enforcing the 
statute, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.4 
However, had this statute gone into effect, individuals living in 
Arizona would have suffered numerous consequences and violations of 
their rights.  Firstly, no Medicaid recipient in Arizona could have 
obtained federally subsidized healthcare services from healthcare 
providers who also performed elective abortions or from facilities where 
such abortions were performed.5  In other words, the legislation would 
have deprived women in Arizona of their choice in provider for family-
planning and preventive-care services.6 
The statute would have also cut off funding to physicians and 
facilities that also perform elective, or “nontherapeutic,”7 abortions.  
Arizona citizens already pay for elective abortions privately because 
Medicaid does not cover them.8  Under the statute, a Medicaid recipient 
would have had to pay out of pocket for all family-planning and 
preventive-care services from any physician who also happens to 
perform elective abortions.9  Thus, women who rely on Medicaid 
reimbursements for family-planning services and preventive care would 
have had to find other physicians in order to afford their care.10  This 
 
 4 Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 858 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’d, 727 
F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014); see also Planned Parenthood Ariz., 
Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Ariz. 2012), appeal dismissed, 727 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 5 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.05(B) (Westlaw 2014).  
 6 Medicaid’s choice-of-provider provision prohibits the limiting of a woman’s choice of 
physician for subsidized family-planning and preventive-care services, with few narrow exceptions. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(23) (Westlaw 2014).  
 7 A nontherapeutic abortion is one that is not medically necessary for the health of the 
mother. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).  
 8 The Constitution does not require states to use federal funding from Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act (Medicaid) for abortions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297-98 (1980) 
(holding that funding restrictions on medically necessary abortions in the Hyde Amendment, as 
applied to Medicaid participants, do not violate “liberty” protected by the Due Process clause of the 
5th Amendment as recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)); see, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 
432 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1977) (holding that States are not required to use Medicaid funding for 
nontherapeutic abortions); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 175, 198-99 (1991) (holding that 
government-funded programs, such as Title X, can set limitations on the  scope of funding, such as 
prohibiting employees of Title X funds from counseling, referring, and advocating for abortion, so 
long as the conduct regulated is within the scope of the funding, but the government cannot regulate 
conduct outside the scope of the federal funding). 
 9 Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 887. 
 10 See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ¶ 39, Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. 
v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp.  2d 858 (D. Ariz. 2013) (No. 12CV01533), aff’d, 727 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014), 2012 WL 2892201.  All three plaintiffs were recipients 
of Medicaid and had long-time physicians who would no longer be able to provide their family-
2
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cutoff would have further reduced the number of physicians within 
Arizona who perform abortions, especially in medically underserved and 
low-provider areas within the state.11  When women do not have actual 
access to doctors who perform elective abortions, they cannot exercise 
their constitutionally protected right to pre-viability abortions.12 
Roe v. Wade is one of the best-known cases because it first 
memorialized women’s constitutional right to abortion.13  However, the 
past four and a half decades are riddled with legislative attempts to erode 
the quality of a woman’s choice in exercising that constitutional right.14  
Legal abortions have been denied public funding.15  Legislation has 
attempted to deny elective abortions to women who did not first obtain 
written consent from their husbands.16  Twenty-four-hour waiting periods 
have been imposed, forcing women to travel long distances and take 
multiple days off from work or school.17  In some federally funded 
programs, physicians are prohibited from counseling, referring, or 
advocating abortion as an option in family planning.18  Additionally, 
certain types of medically supported abortion procedures have been 
 
planning and preventive-care services and receive their Medicaid reimbursements.  Id.  (“If the Act 
goes into effect, they will be prevented from receiving services from their provider of choice, will 
have their health care interrupted, and may encounter difficulties finding alternative care.”).   
 11 As of 2008, there were already fewer than twenty physicians in the entire state of Arizona 
who performed abortions.  GUTTMACHER INST., TRENDS IN ABORTION IN ARIZONA, 1973–2008 
(Jan. 2011), available at www.guttmacher.org/presentations/state_ab_pt/arizona.pdf; see also 
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10, ¶ 39 (alleging that plaintiffs lived in 
“low provider” and “medically underserved” areas).  
 12 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (defining the compelling point for which a state 
may interfere with a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion is after viability, when a fetus 
could survive outside the woman’s womb).  
 13 Id.  
 14 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 
(2000); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 
490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 
(1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52 (1976). 
 15 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 470; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 310 (validating 
withholding of Medicaid funding even for medically necessary abortions).  
 16 This legislation was invalidated as an unconstitutional infringement of a woman’s right to 
an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69; accord Casey, 505 
U.S. at 898. 
 17 Casey, 505 U.S. at 838-39 (1992) (holding the twenty-four-hour waiting period as 
constitutional). 
 18 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 192 (holding as constitutionally firm to deny participating 
Title X physicians and their staff from soliciting, referring, or counseling abortion as an option to 
their patients).  
3
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outright prohibited.19  These back-door attempts to overrule the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade must be called out for what 
they are:  wolves in sheeps’ clothing.20  Many of these legislative 
attempts to erode the force of Roe v. Wade have been found to be 
constitutional in isolation, but when these legislative acts are looked at as 
a whole, they equate to nothing more than a scheme to substantially 
impede a woman’s access to abortion.21 
The facts of Betlach exemplify legislative backdoor infringement of 
a woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to an abortion.22  Using 
Medicaid requirements as a cloak, the Arizona legislature attempted to 
deny access to legal abortions by reducing, if not effectively eliminating, 
the physicians and the facilities that could provide abortions within the 
state. 
The narrow issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit in reviewing 
Betlach was whether the legislation at issue contravened the federal 
Medicaid Act.23  The court swiftly invalidated the legislation, basing its 
holding on traditional statutory interpretation.24  The Ninth Circuit’s 
holding, however, will have a limited impact on the bigger issue:  
infringement of a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion.  In 
Betlach, there was a federal statute that directly conflicted with 
Arizona’s enacted statue.25  However, the door is still left open for 
similar anti-abortion legislation to go into effect when there is no 
conflicting federal statute on point.  Until the bigger issue is resolved, 
this type of legislation will continue to impede a woman’s access to an 
abortion.  Accordingly, until the issue is addressed head-on, the future 
 
 19 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930 (finding statute prohibiting partial-birth 
abortions invalid because it did not have an exception for the woman’s health and it would have 
prevented many alternative forms of abortion); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 133 (2007) (finding 
prohibition of “intact D & E” abortion procedure as valid legislation).  
 20 See Erik Eckholm, Access to Abortion Falling as States Pass Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 3, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/us/women-losing-access-to-abortion-as-opponents-
gain-ground-in-state-legislatures.html.  
 21 See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, No. 13-
51008, 2014 WL 5040899, at *29 (5th Cir. Oct. 9, 2014) (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“[w]e cannot look at women’s ability to overcome an obstacle in isolation and 
use that predicted ability to overcome barriers to somehow conclude that the obstacle is not 
substantial or undue.”); Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013 
State Policy Review, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, 
www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2014) 
(“Over the course of the year, 39 states enacted 141 provisions related to reproductive health and 
rights. Half of these new provisions, 70 in 22 states, sought to restrict access to abortion services.”). 
 22 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. 
 23 Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id.  
4
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appears increasingly bleak for future claims against legislative 
infringement of this constitutionally protected right. 
This Note addresses the limited impact of the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding, especially for women living in states hostile to abortion rights.26  
These legislative attempts to infringe on a woman’s right to an abortion 
are based on opinion and emotion, not reason and common sense.  An 
objective view of the legislation stacked against a woman in exercising 
her right, including legislation against physicians who provide the 
service, illustrates how all of these obstacles have effectively become a 
wall.  A woman’s constitutional right should not continue to be chipped 
away, one state statute at a time, until there is no real choice to a 
woman’s right to an abortion. Moreover, this type of legislation falls 
hardest on women and families who cannot afford access to alternative 
care.27  If and when there are no physicians or clinics available to 
perform legal abortions, then the state has effectively made the woman’s 
choice for her.  It is indisputable that a right is not a right at all if it 
cannot be exercised. 
This Note argues for a revival of the Casey Test.28  The test should 
be applied to statutes as a whole, asking whether the purpose or effect of 
a statute places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman in 
exercising her legal right to choose to terminate her pregnancy before 
viability.29  Part I of this Note looks into the legal and procedural 
background of Betlach, including all of the plaintiffs’ original claims and 
the decision’s limited impact.  Part II analyzes how the legislation in 
Betlach would have failed under the Casey test.  Specifically, Part II 
addresses how this type of legislation, both in purpose and effect, places 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman accessing an abortion.  
Finally, this Note concludes with a recommendation for future plaintiffs 
 
 26 For more information on states hostile to abortion rights, see Rachel Benson Gold & 
Elizabeth Nash, Troubling Trend: More States Hostile to Abortion Rights as Middle Ground Shrinks, 
15 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 1 (2012), available at 
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/15/1/gpr150114.html; see also Nash et al., supra note 21.  
 27 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10, ¶¶ 33-37 (alleging that 
Planned Parenthood Arizona had thirteen medical centers in areas the federal government classified 
as “medically underserved”). The federal government made the classification based on four 
variables, one of which is the percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty level.  
Additionally, five of their centers in Arizona are in “low provider” areas, based on similar criteria, 
including high percentage of the population under the poverty level.  See, e.g., Find Shortage Areas: 
HPSA & MUA/P by Address, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://datawarehouse.hrsa.gov/geoadvisor/shortagedesignationadvisor.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 
2014); Guidelines for MUA and MUP Designation, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES, www.hrsa.gov/shortage/mua/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).  
 28 Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).  
 29 Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
5
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to raise the infringement issue, allowing courts to address the impact this 
type of anti-abortion legislation as a whole has on a constitutionally 
protected right. 
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD ARIZONA INC. V. BETLACH 
The legal framework and procedural background of Betlach provide 
context for the Ninth Circuit’s limited holding.  The legal framework 
explains the possible motivations behind Planned Parenthood’s strategic 
decisions, which are readily displayed in the case’s procedural history.  
Ultimately, the plaintiffs chose to narrow the issue before the court to the 
dispositive claim only.  As a result, the court was not given the 
opportunity to address the other constitutional issues.  Though the 
plaintiffs were justified in their strategic decision, and the Ninth Circuit 
accurately decided the case, the holding has a limited impact on future 
plaintiffs. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey provide the legal framework to discuss a woman’s 
right to an abortion.30  Roe v. Wade established a woman’s ability to 
choose abortion, before viability, as a right protected by the 
Constitution.31  This right is derived from both the Ninth Amendment 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is a 
protected “liberty” interest.32 
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackman said that, in regard to a 
woman’s decisional autonomy over her body in consultation with her 
physician, “If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated 
by an abortion free of interference by the State.”33  In other words, the 
state may not interfere with a woman in accessing and obtaining an 
abortion from a licensed physician.  The point at which the state may 
interfere is viability, when the fetus can survive outside the mother’s 
body.34  The Court approximated the viability point at the end of the first 
trimester.35  Prior to this point, the “abortion decision and its effectuation 
 
 30 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 31 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
6
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must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending 
physician.”36  The Court recognized the state’s interest in protecting the 
mother by allowing for state regulation that promoted the health of the 
mother subsequent to the end of the first trimester.37  When the fetus is 
considered viable, the state is permitted to regulate or prohibit abortions 
in order to protect the health of both the mother and the viable fetus.38  
However, the state is not permitted to ban an abortion when it is 
“necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”39 
Roe v. Wade laid the baseline for protection of a woman’s choice to 
terminate her pregnancy before viability, while Casey set the boundaries 
on legislative interference and allowed for some state inference even 
before viability.40  The Court in Casey held that legislation is invalid 
when it places an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion if it 
creates a substantial obstacle, in purpose or effect, in a woman’s path to 
accessing an abortion pre-viability.41  The Casey Court’s application of 
what constitutes an undue burden set the guidelines for how the lower 
courts weigh substantial interference, which violates the constitutional 
protection, versus incidental interference, which does not violate the 
Constitution.42 
Unfortunately, the review of a woman’s constitutionally protected 
right has morphed into a piecemeal approach.  This approach asks 
whether state legislation infringes on a woman’s right to an abortion by 
analyzing the statute section by section, with little to no regard for the 
total effect that the statute, as a whole, has on that right.43 
 
 36 Id. at 164. 
 37 Id. at 163. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 163–64. 
 40 Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992). The Court also did 
away with the trimester framework of Roe v. Wade and replaced it with a line between pre-viability 
and post-viability that defines when a State may regulate abortions and what standard of scrutiny 
applies.  Id at 870.  
 41 Id at 877. 
 42 Id. (finding the requirement of spousal written consent a substantial obstacle in the path of 
a woman in obtaining an abortion, pre-viability, but finding information distributed to the mother 
promoting alternatives to abortion, twenty-four-hour waiting periods, and certain reporting 
requirements not unduly burdensome).  
 43 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, No. 13-
51008, 2014 WL 5040899, at *24 (5th Cir. Oct. 9, 2014) (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (criticizing the panel for the “threadbare consideration of the purpose and effect 
of the law, each in isolation, and without reference to important contextual realities in which the law 
will operate”); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 
(5th Cir. 2013); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding no 
undue burden because plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate that a large fraction of women would 
be affected by one clinic’s closure); Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden , 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).  
7
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B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD ARIZONA 
INC. V. BETLACH 
The procedural background of Betlach explains, in part, how this 
particular anti-abortion legislation was not subjected to the Casey test.  
Arizona’s statute states, “[Arizona] or any political subdivision of 
[Arizona] may not enter into a contract with or make a grant to any 
person that performs nonfederally qualified abortions or maintains or 
operates a facility where nonfederally qualified abortions are performed 
for the provision of family planning services.”44  Planned Parenthood is a 
nonprofit organization that has thirteen clinics within Arizona and 
provides a range of family-planning services and preventive care.45  
Planned Parenthood clinics in Arizona treat about 3,000 Medicaid 
recipients each year and receive approximately $350,000 for their 
services, not including their privately funded nontherapeutic abortion 
services.46 
The summer before the legislation would have gone into effect, 
Planned Parenthood received a letter from its contractor for Medicaid 
reimbursements requesting that Planned Parenthood return a signed form 
stating that it would not perform elective abortions or continue to operate 
any facility where elective abortions were performed.47  The letter stated 
that if Planned Parenthood did not return the form completed, it would 
no longer receive any Medicaid reimbursements for its federally 
qualified services, family planning, and preventive care.48  The 
reimbursements Planned Parenthood had been receiving without issue for 
 
But see Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 194 (D. Utah 1973) (refusing to piece out the statute and 
evaluate constitutionality for each particular part but invalidating the statute as a whole: “Each and 
every challenged part of these statutes was intended to and does contribute, when each statute is read 
as a whole, to that improper purpose and effect . . . .  [T]he Court is neither obliged nor free to 
scrutinize the minutiae of these statutes to cull out those parts that, given a strained interpretation, 
might be thought to have an independent constitutionality. The Court cannot and will not edit these 
statutes in order to alter the legislative purpose . . . .  We find all of the statutes and portions of 
statutes contested herein invalid in toto.”). 
 44 Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2013);  
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.05(F)(4) (Westlaw 2014) (defining a “[n]onfederally 
qualified abortion” as “an abortion that does not meet the requirements for federal reimbursement 
under title XIX of the [S]ocial [S]ecurity [A]ct.”), invalidated by Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. 
Betlach, 727 F.3d 960. 
 45 Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d at 964. 
 46 Id. 
 47 The Medicaid contractor was Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS). 
Id. at 965. 
 48 Id. 
8
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nearly twenty years would essentially cease, unless Planned Parenthood 
stopped providing elective abortion services.49 
In July 2012, Planned Parenthood, along with three individuals and 
a physician, filed a complaint to prevent the statute from going into 
effect and eliminating their Medicaid reimbursements.50  The complaint 
alleged that the legislation directly violated the freedom-of-choice 
provision in the Medicaid Act, as well as the Due Process Clause, 
Supremacy Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Contracts Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.51  The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona 
granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the Medicaid freedom-of-
choice provision52 conferred individual rights enforceable under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.53 Additionally, the district court found that the plaintiffs 
would likely succeed on the merits of their Medicaid Act violation claim, 
and that Planned Parenthood would suffer irreparable harm if the 
preliminary injunction were not granted.54 
With the preliminary injunction granted, the plaintiffs filed for 
summary judgment as to the alleged Medicaid violation, based on the 
conclusions of law determined by the district court.55  Specifically, the 
district court found that the state legislation violated the federal Medicaid 
Act by the explicit language in the Act’s choice-of-provider provision.56  
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit had addressed a virtually identical issue 
that further supported the district court’s determination.  The Seventh 
Circuit case, Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Indiana, affirmed a 
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Indiana legislation that 
denied Medicaid funding to physicians who performed elective abortions 
or facilities where elective abortions were performed.57  Indiana’s 
legislation ignored Medicaid’s requirement that recipients may use funds 
to pay for family-planning services from any qualified physician within 
 
 49 Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d 868, 886 (D. Ariz. 2012), 
appeal dismissed, 727 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 50 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10. 
 51 Id. ¶ 4. This Note focuses only on limited impact of the Ninth Circuit’s holding on the 
issue of a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution. Other constitutional claims, though arguably appropriate as well, will not be discussed. 
Of the constitutional issues raised in the complaint, none regarded a woman’s constitutional right to 
an abortion, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  
 52 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(23), 1396d(a)(4)(C) (Westlaw 2014). 
 53 Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 876-80 (applying the 
Blessing three-factor test and determining that the federal statute creates an enforceable right). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 858, 860 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 56 See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 883–84. 
 57 Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 
988 (7th Cir. 2012). 
9
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the state.58  Like Arizona’s scheme, the Indiana legislation was intended 
to stop any indirect subsidization of abortions.59  The Seventh Circuit 
found that Indiana’s legislation directly violated Medicaid’s free-choice-
of-provider provision by limiting Medicaid recipients’ choice among 
qualified providers.60 
On summary judgment in Betlach, the narrow question before the 
district court was whether Arizona’s legislation violated the Medicaid 
Act as a matter of law, an inquiry that depended only on whether the 
state law was incompatible with the federal law.61  The district court 
ultimately held that Arizona’s legislation was invalid because the state 
statute directly contradicted Medicaid Act’s free-choice-of-provider 
provision, as a matter of law.62  Therefore, Planned Parenthood was 
granted summary judgment based solely on statutory grounds.63 
Thereafter, Arizona appealed the district court’s summary judgment 
that permanently enjoined the enforcement of the legislation against such 
Medicaid providers as Planned Parenthood.64  The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Medicaid 
Act’s free-choice-of-provider provision confers a private right of action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the state legislation violated the 
Medicaid Act as a matter of law.65  More specifically, the court of 
appeals found that the Arizona legislation violated the Medicaid Act by 
denying recipients a choice in a qualified provider for their family-
planning services, a freedom explicitly granted by the Medicaid free-
choice-of-provider provision.66 
Though the plaintiffs in this case were able to prevail on this narrow 
claim, the success had a limited impact in furthering a woman’s 
fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy before viability.  Since 
Planned Parenthood’s summary judgment was granted purely on the state 
statute’s violation of the federal Medicaid Act, no constitutional 
arguments in the complaint were addressed by the district court or the 
court of appeals.67 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 967. 
 60 Id. at 978–80. 
 61 Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 858, 860 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 62 Id. at 864. 
 63 Id. at 866. 
 64 Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 65 Id.  The court also found that there was no need to address the appeal of the preliminary 
injunction since the district court entered a final judgment while the preliminary injunction was on 
appeal and the permanent injunction mooted the preliminary-injunction appeal. Id.  
 66 Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d at 963.   
 67 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10.  
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This holding ensured that the Arizona legislation would not go into 
effect, protecting Arizona residents, but it remains uncertain what will 
happen to other legislative attempts to erode Roe v. Wade when 
confronting federal statutes that lack an explicit free-choice-of-provider 
provision.  In other words, when federal statutes do not create and spell 
out a woman’s right to freedom of choice in her provider for family-
planning services or preventive care, a woman’s constitutional right to an 
abortion is still at risk. 
II. THE LEGISLATION IN BETLACH WOULD HAVE FAILED 
UNDER THE CASEY TEST 
Had there not been a federal statute on point that disposed of the 
issue in Betlach, the plaintiffs could have raised the issue against 
unconstitutional infringement of a woman’s right to an abortion pre-
viability.68  Raising the issue gives courts an opportunity to address the 
burden this kind of legislation places in the path of woman in exercising 
her right to an abortion.  The following sections highlight how a court 
would find Arizona’s legislation invalid under Casey’s undue-burden 
test.69  Specifically, Arizona’s legislation places a substantial obstacle to 
a woman accessing abortion services in both purpose and effect. 
A. ARIZONA’S LEGISLATION PLACES AN UNDUE BURDEN IN PURPOSE 
ON A WOMAN EXERCISING HER RIGHT TO AN ABORTION 
Arizona legislators created the legislation to erect another barrier for 
women attempting to exercise their right to obtain abortion services.  In 
their amicus curiae brief, twenty-nine of Arizona’s senators, 
representatives, and representatives-elect supported the legislation and 
unambiguously stated that they did not want any federal funding to 
“indirectly” support abortion services in the State of Arizona.70  The 
amicus curiae brief stated, “Through this restriction, the State 
acknowledged that an abortion business benefits from taxpayer funding 
when the business’ proprietor receives such funds to pay for healthcare 
services (in this case, family planning services).”71  In this manner, the 
legislators expressed a clear intent not to allow the “abortion business” to 
 
 68 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10. 
 69 Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).  
 70 Amicus Curiae Brief of 29 Arizona Senators, Representatives, and Representatives-Elect 
in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal of the District of Arizona at 1, Planned 
Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960 (No. 12-17558), 2012 WL 6850110. 
 71 Id. at 2. 
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benefit from Medicaid funding, even when it is legally obtained through 
traditionally Medicaid-funded services, such as preventive care and 
family planning.  By targeting abortion services and attacking the 
“abortion business” as a whole, Arizona legislators were attempting to 
completely cut off federal funding to all abortion providers within the 
state who have been receiving reimbursements for their qualified 
Medicaid services for over twenty years, with no better justification other 
than not wanting to “indirectly” support abortion services. 
When state legislators target all facilities that offer elective abortion 
services and label them as part of a “business” that should not be 
indirectly funded federally, they are attacking the necessary components 
for a woman to effectuate a legal, pre-viability abortion.  The purpose 
behind the statute is to prevent women from being able to obtain an 
abortion by adding another obstacle:  unavailability of facilities and 
physicians who can perform such services.  In sum, the state legislators 
purposefully targeted a specific type of service as part of a business that 
should not be allowed to participate like other businesses when 
performing Medicaid qualified services because they do not agree with 
the service provided. 
When legislators make it harder for physicians to sustain a business 
in Arizona they are intentionally placing an obstacle in the path of a 
woman to obtain an abortion.  The only option left for facilities that 
depend on federal funding as part of their business operations, like 
Planned Parenthood, is to stop performing elective abortions.72  This is 
no choice at all.  What the legislators deem as the state’s “public policy” 
is nothing short of a take-it-or-leave-it situation that forces physicians 
and abortion facilities’ hands to “refrain” from performing elective 
abortion services within the state, because those legislators do not agree 
with the service.73 
The Arizona legislators’ stated purpose was to further reduce the 
number of abortions performed in the State of Arizona.  In support of this 
argument, Arizona legislators referenced a study showing the 
relationship between public funding and the incidence of abortion within 
the state.74  In 2009, the Guttmacher Institute had conducted a Literature 
Review that demonstrated a strong consensus that abortion rates are 
reduced when public funding is restricted.75  The legislators used this 
study to try to demonstrate that by taking away any federal funding to 
 
 72 Id. at 5. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 9–10. 
 75 Id. at 13. 
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corporations or facilities such as Planned Parenthood of Arizona, 
abortion services would not be “indirectly subsidized” with federal 
funds.76  The Guttmacher studies, however, demonstrate less of a link 
between federal funding “subsidizing” abortions in such facilities and 
more of link between declining federal funding and declining numbers of 
women exercising their right to abortion.77  What Arizona legislators 
refused to acknowledge was that these abortions performed in the state 
were legal and that women had a constitutionally protected right in 
accessing them.  This was a purposeful attempt by Arizona state 
legislature to overturn Roe, which is an invalid purpose.78 
Targeting and denying funding for Medicaid qualified services to 
physicians and facilities simply because they also happen to perform 
privately funded abortions is a direct attempt to cut all abortion services 
entirely out of the equation, the purpose of which is to further anti-
abortion policy.  Legislation of this type does nothing but place obstacles 
in the paths of women trying to exercise their constitutional right to 
abortion.  Without federal funding, many physicians cannot provide 
necessary medical services to their patients, and more women are 
deterred from accessing such services.  This legislation was meant to 
punish rather than support women’s rights. 
B. ARIZONA’S LEGISLATION PLACES AN UNDUE BURDEN IN EFFECT 
ON A WOMAN EXERCISING HER RIGHT TO AN ABORTION 
The effect of Arizona’s legislation would have been to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman trying to access abortion 
services in Arizona by both removing physicians already in low-provider 
areas and further decreasing providers within the state as a whole.  The 
net effect of this legislation is outlined by the facts presented in the 
complaint, the findings of fact at the preliminary-injunction phase, and 
the statistical analysis of Arizona’s abortion rates.79 Thus, the legislation 
would fail the second prong of the Casey test because eliminating federal 
funding would have the effect of pushing both the physicians who 
perform abortions and the facilities where they are performed out of 
areas already in need of physicians specialized in family planning and 
 
 76 Id. at 9–16. 
 77 STANLEY K. HENSHAW ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICAID 
FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS:  A LITERATURE REVIEW (2009), available at 
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/MedicaidLitReview.pdf.  
 78 See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996) (invalidating state legislation for 
having the purpose of overriding Roe).  
 79 Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Ariz. 2012).  
13
Breslin: Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Betlach
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014
BRESLIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/14  10:19 AM 
66 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
preventive care, as well as abortions.80  We know this because five of the 
Planned Parenthood centers are in areas classified as “low provider,”81 
and thirteen are in areas classified as “medically underserved.”82 
Although the complaint focused on the direct effect on women and 
families who would not be able to access family-planning and 
preventive-care services from their personal physicians, another effect of 
such legislation would be that without Medicaid reimbursement, many 
clinics such as Planned Parenthood would not have been able to remain 
in operation.  This is especially true in areas where the majority of the 
patients rely on Medicaid funding for their care.  Arizona already has 
low-provider and medically underserved areas where Planned 
Parenthood is one of the few medical resources.83  Thus, a woman in 
such an area would have little to no options for accessing family-
planning services, preventive care, or terminating her pregnancy, if she 
so chooses.84 
The Casey court found it constitutionally valid for state legislation 
to incidentally burden a woman’s access to an abortion, as long as the 
purpose was valid.85  The Arizona legislators may argue that the 
incidental burden of their legislation, reducing physicians and facilities in 
the state, does not amount to a substantial burden because the burden is 
only incidental.  This argument weakens, however, when the legislation 
is looked at as a whole.  Removing a significant number of physicians 
from the state or entirely out of low-provider areas when a woman 
cannot afford to take multiple days off of work for a drive across the 
state to find a physician, combined with the twenty-four-hour waiting 
period, amounts to a state’s legislative “veto” of the woman’s right to 
access abortion services.86  Legislation such as this cannot be looked at in 
isolation.  When this type of state action is stacked on top of the other 
anti-abortion legislation already in place in Arizona, the state legislators 
 
 80 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10, ¶ 33. The “medically 
underserved” classification is based on four variables: 1) the ratio of primary medical care 
physicians per 1,000 populations, 2) the infant mortality rate, 3) the percentage of the population 
with incomes below the poverty level, and 4) the percentage of the population age 65 or over. See id.  
 81 Id. ¶ 33. 
 82 Id.; see also Guidelines for MUA and MUP Designation, supra note 26’. To find an 
overview of statistical information, see Find Shortage Areas: HPSA by State & County, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://hpsafind.hrsa.gov/HPSASearch.aspx (last visited Oc. 5, 
2014) (select “Arizona,” “All Counties,” and “Primary Medical Care”)’.  
 83 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10, ¶ 33. 
 84 See id. ¶ 33. 
 85 Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
 86 See id. at 897 (finding that requiring a husband’s consent before abortion service can be 
provided was an unconstitutional veto power over a woman exercising her right to an abortion pre-
viability). 
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can no longer claim that this legislation does not amount to a substantial 
burden in the path of a woman who seeks to have an abortion. 
The type of legislation at issue in Betlach is analogous to the 
legislation in Casey, in which the Court refused to uphold legislation that 
required a husband’s written consent in order for a woman to obtain an 
abortion.87  The Court properly found such requirements are unduly 
burdensome on a woman’s right to an abortion because they give the 
spouse “veto power” over her right to choose an abortion pre-viability.88  
Like spousal veto powers, when state legislators push all abortion 
providers out of the State of Arizona, they effectively “veto” a woman’s 
choice in the matter.  Clinics such as Planned Parenthood would not be 
able to remain in medically underserved areas within the state, where 
their patients cannot pay out-of-pocket for their family-planning and 
preventive-care services, nor compete with clinics that do receive federal 
subsidies for the same family-planning services and preventive care.89  
Such legislation places a complete wall between a woman’s choice and 
her ability to effectuate her choice when there are no longer physicians or 
facilities within the state that perform elective abortions.  Such 
legislation would have given Arizona state legislators veto power over a 
woman’s constitutionally protected choice, a veto power the Casey court 
refused to allow. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislation at issue in Betlach would fail under Casey’s undue-
burden test, in both purpose and effect, when looked at realistically and 
in combination with existing legislation.  The current piecemeal 
approach used by courts to address potential obstacles in the path of a 
woman accessing an abortion needs to come to an end.  Instead, such 
legislation should be reviewed as a whole and found invalid in its 
entirety.  State legislators should not be allowed to override 
constitutional rights because they do not agree with them.90  Plaintiffs 
must assert their constitutional rights, even when controversial.  Judicial 
review must be given the opportunity to account for the denial of a 
 
 87 Id. at 874. 
 88 Id. at 897; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
(invalidating a husband-consent requirement as an unconstitutional infringement of a woman’s right 
to an abortion pre-Casey).  
 89 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that 
denying federal funding for elective abortion services makes choosing to have an abortion 
impossible for indigent women).  
 90 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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woman’s constitutionally protected choice because of legislators stacking 
legislation against her and her physician.  Courts should be given the 
opportunity to apply the Casey test to anti-abortion legislation.  The facts 
of Betlach exemplify the argument plaintiffs should make when there is 
not a federal statute expressly in conflict with a state’s anti-abortion 
legislation, as there happened to be in Betlach.  The wall blocking 
women from exercising their right to a legal abortion remains tall and 
wide, blocking the poorest first.  To call this legislation anything other 
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